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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGE AWARDS:
THE NEED FOR A DUAL APPROACH
I. Introduction
Damage awards in medical malpractice' actions brought in New
York State courts have increased steadily 2 in the past ten years. 3 This
1. Many of the modern definitions of medical malpractice derive from the
standard enunciated in Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 209-10, 49 N.E. 760, 762
(1898):
The law relating to malpractice is simple and well settled, although not
always easy of application. . . . Upon consenting to treat a patient, it
becomes [a physician's or surgeon's] duty to use reasonable care and dili-
gence in the exercise of his skill and the application of his learning to
accomplish the purpose for which he was employed. He is under the
further obligation to use his best judgment in exercising his skill and
applying his knowledge. The law holds him liable for an injury to his
patient resulting from want of the requisite knowledge and skill, or the
omission to exercise reasonable care, or the failure to use his best judg-
ment. . . . The rule of reasonable care and diligence does not require the
exercise of the highest possible degree of care, and, to render a physician
and surgeon liable, it is not enough that there has been a less degree of care
than some other medical man might have shown, or less than even he
himself might have bestowed, but there must be a want of ordinary and
reasonable care, leading to a bad result .... The rule requiring him to use
his best judgment does not hold him liable for a mere error of judgment,
provided he does what he thinks is best after careful examination ...
For a discussion of the genesis of medical malpractice law and lawsuits in the United
States, see generally Sandor, The History of Professional Liability Suits in the United
States, 163 J. AMER. MED. A. 459 (1957); 1 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 8.01 (1960).
2. In New York, annual losses incurred by insured parties, which include dam-
age awards and attorney's costs for prior claims, reflect a steady increase: for 1971,
$7.1 million; 1972, $11.2 million; 1973, $17.4 million; 1974, $21.7 million; 1975,
$27.6 million; 1976, $23.5 million; 1977, $31.2 million; 1978, $47.3 million; 1979,
$64.2 million; 1980, $81.9 million; and 1981, $91.7 million. 1970-1975 figures reflect
the amounts paid by Employers Insurance of Wausau. Letter from George A.
Wright, Jr., Vice-president, Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Co. (March 30,
1983) (listing amounts paid by his company's predecessor). 1976-1981 figures reflect
the amounts paid by all carriers as compiled by the New York State Insurance
Department and reflect a similar data base to the previous years. Telephone inter-
view with Mark Presser, Chief of the Property & Casualty Division, New York State
Insurance Department (Sept. 29, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Presser]. Even more
significantly, the value of average claims paid has also increased dramatically: 1976,
$39,858; 1977, $44,209; 1978, $54,033; 1979, $62,963; 1980, $76,469; and 1981,
$89,351. Presser. The New York State Insurance Department calculates that the
continuing rate of increase from 1976 to 1981 averages out to 18 % a year and that if
the current exponential rate of increase continues, the average medical malpractice
claim made in 1982 will be paid out in 1989 at $700,000. Id.
3. Actions against physicians have been known since early times and were
frequently expressed in contract terms. 1 D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 1,
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trend surpasses the general increase in awards granted in other types
of litigation involving insured losses brought in the same period. 4 The
tremendous growth in malpractice liability has resulted in higher
premiums 5 which insured physicians pass along in higher prices to
health care consumers.6 Attempts to break this spiral by legislative
reforms have met with little success. 7
8.01, at 188. Sandor, supra note 1, reports early English cases appearing from 1374
and notes that by 1518 the College of Physicians of London provided for a fine or 14
days imprisonment for any member who committed malpractice. Id. at 459. Sandor
notes that the first American case was Cross v. Guthrey, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794),
decided upon pleadings of breach of contract. Sandor, supra note 1, at 460. But the
American law of malpractice as it evolved in the last century embraced the principles
of negligence. Id. The author's study of appellate decisions reveals few cases reported
in each state before 1900; however, malpractice actions appear in significant num-
bers after the turn of the century. Id. at 460 (graph), 461-63 (Table 1). Although
malpractice actions usually are based upon theories of negligence, modern courts
have also recognized a contract theory. Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641
(1929) (breach of promise to achieve a specific result); Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y.
543, 547, 127 N.E.2d 330, 332 (1955) (breach of promise to use a specific method of
treatment).
4. The average rate of increase in medical malpractice awards, see note 2 supra,
is considered by State Insurance Department analysts to be the highest rate of
increase of all insured loss categories. Presser, supra note 2. Trends for casualty losses
are calculated from the average rate at which individual claims are paid and thus do
not reflect an increase in the number of claims paid. Telephone interview with Don
Yazey, Chief Information Officer, Insurance Services Office (Jan. 10, 1983). The
Insurance Services Office, an industry-supported actuarial and statistical research
organization, calculates that the trend in New York State for "completed opera-
tions"-all liabilities associated with the production of products and services and thus
the most nearly similar area to medical liability-increased at 13.5 % per year for the
years 1973 through 1980. Id.
5. Premium rates for physicians in New York are set according to medical
specialty and county of practice. Specialties are grouped into 13 "classes." 1982 NEW
YORK STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RATE MANUAL Exhibit 1 [hereinafter cited as
RATE MANUAL]. The least expensive category includes psychiatrists and pathologists;
the most expensive is for neurosurgeons. For example, a general practitioner, placed
in the third lowest class, paid between $1,200 to $2,400 annually for coverage in
1977. T. LOMBARDI, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 48 (1978). Today, the same
coverage ranges from $2,720 (premium class 11 in all upstate counties) to $6,013
(premium class 11 in Nassau, Suffolk and Sullivan Counties). RATE MANUAL, supra,
at 1. High risk specialties pay higher premiums. Neurosurgeons (premium class 1)
pay in a range of $20,830 (all upstate counties) to $46,044 (Nassau, Suffolk and
Sullivan Counties); followed closely by $40,187 (Bronx, Kings, Queens, Richmond
and Rockland Counties) and $35,915 (New York County). Id. Rates for obstetricians
(premium class 3) range similarly: from a low of $17,011 (in all upstate counties) to
$37,603 (Nassau, Suffolk and Sullivan Counties) to $32,819 (Bronx, Kings, Queens,
Richmond and Rockland Counties) and $29,331 (New York County). Id,
6. See notes 31 & 78 infra and accompanying text.
7. This trend appears unabated despite a 1975 legislative enactment designed to
control these costs. For a complete discussion of the 1975 enactment see notes 43-51
infra and accompanying text.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Controversy surrounds the question of what caused this growth in
malpractice awards. Plaintiffs' attorneys contend that increases in
malpractice awards have evolved from widespread physician careless-
ness which is best deterred by bringing suit." Defendants counter that
large monetary awards are often the result of legal arguments which
appeal more to a jury's sense of sympathy for an injured patient than
to any clear negligence.9
Some commentators have argued that little provable malpractice
occurs and that too many cases of non-negligent injury result in
awards. ° The present system, it is contended, treats some physicians
unfairly when awards are levied without regard to fault."1 Others
argue that large numbers of injured patients are unable to gain any
compensation at all.' 2 In any event, the present tort/litigation insur-
8. See C. KRAMER, THE NEGLIGENT DOCTOR 15-18 (1968). The author theorizes
that a high percentage of medical treatments, especially surgical operations, are
undertaken by poorly-trained and unsupervised persons and that the current levels of
malpractice actions represents only a portion of those which could be brought. Id. In
addition, he posits the theory that litigation is necessary to hold the medical profes-
sion accountable. Id. at 17.
9. D. HAVENER, OBSERVATIONS REGARDING INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION 7 (Defense Research Institute No. 4, 1977).
One indispensable prerequisite to a recovery should be a physician's pro-
fessional negligence producing patient injury. Some doctors are negligent
and cause patient injury. However, that factor is often lacking in claims
asserted and suits filed. Many claims arise only from the fact of a bad
result-sometimes a catastrophic patient result. Even without clear and
undisputed medical negligence, if there is some evidence of possible physi-
cian fault, before a jury such an instance can produce catastrophic results
for the physician as well as for the patient.
Id.
10. The contention has been stated this way:
The first tier and the root cause of the medical malpractice problem as
identified by a massive government study commissioned by the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare is that adverse results inevitably
occur during the course of medical treatment. These iatrogenic injuries
[those induced during treatment] may or may not be caused by the negli-
gence of someone in the health-care hierarchy, but arise regularly because
medical technology, though highly sophisticated, has yet to overcome all
untoward effects of drugs and surgical procedures.
Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REv. 655,
655-65 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation].
11. T. LOMBARDI, supra note 5, at 21-22. "The complexities of modern medicine,
doctors maintain, make it very difficult for a lay jury to judge the merits of medical
malpractice cases. . . . 'The members of the jury don't know who is telling the truth
but they can see a crippled man in a chair.' " Id.
12. See Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, in
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1-2 (1977). "[M]edical malpractice suits are at best a capri-
cious and inequitable means of compensation. While some claimants obtain very
large awards, others suffering from equally serious injuries receive no compensation
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ance system has resulted in increased fees to health care consumers 13
and uncertainty of compensation for many injured patients. 14
This Note will examine the evolution of increased malpractice costs
in New York and their distribution throughout the health care system.
The current litigation system and several recently proposed methods
of equitable compensation will be analyzed. Discussion will then focus
on the extent to which these proposals satisfy the twin criteria of
deterring the negligent physician and compensating injured patients.
In addition, the constitutional issues raised by alternative compensa-
tion systems and limitations on damage awards will be addressed.
This Note concludes by offering alternative proposals for compensat-
ing certain non-negligent injuries with limited compensation awards,
a separate funding mechanism and an alternative verdict for the jury.
II. The Phenomenon of Medical Malpractice
A. Recent Causes and Effects
The past decade has witnessed an acute increase in the number of
medical malpractice suits.' 5 Beyond the problem that there always
will be a small number of poorly-trained, overworked or simply care-
at all." Id.; J.B. SPENCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 279, 283-84 (Practicing Law Instit.
No. 68, 1974) (practicing attorney cautions colleagues that because of the time and
expense of litigating malpractice cases only the most substantial cases should be
accepted); Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-A No-Fault
Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 613 INS. L.J. 69, 89 (1974)
(suggests that many patients do not even consider bringing suit because they are
unaware of any treatment injury, "lack a litigious spirit," or regard the physician as
"nonculpable").
13. See notes 31 & 78 infra and accompanying text.
14. Because of the factors cited in note 12 supra, the ability of an injured patient
to receive monetary damages depends upon a variety of events occurring in succes-
sion: He must be aware of the injury, he must suspect that malpractice occurred, he
must find an attorney willing to take the case on a contingency, and he must be
willing to wait until the end of all proceedings to learn if his efforts have resulted in
any compensation. See also Law, Improve the Medicine, Not the Law, EMPIRE ST.
REP. 41, 42 (Sept. 1982) ("[i]n most cases this heavy burden [of proving professional
negligence] cannot be met").
15. See Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation, supra note 10, at 656. In New
York, the number of malpractice actions filed has followed this trend: 1976, 1,421;
1977, 1,667. THE ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AND THE
OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORTS, 1976 (Table 29); 1977 (Table
30). In 1978, 1,647; 1979, 1,862; 1980, 1,793; 1981, 2,129. CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE COURTS, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORTS,
1978 (Table 29); 1979 (Table 29); 1980 (Table 29); 1981 (Table 3-21).
[Vol. XI
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less physicians,' 6 there have been significant changes in the patient-
doctor relationship. 17 Patients, with increasing expectations that mod-
ern medicine will cure their ailments,' 8 have a greater willingness to
bring suit."' Often, these medical malpractice claims are raised
16. See C. KRAMER, supra note 8. "Violating fundamental principles of good
treatment has become . . . alarmingly widespread... " Id. at 15. See also Law,
supra note 14, at 41 ("[this] is a crisis resulting from the number of patients who
suffer injury as the result of substandard, sometimes wholly unnecessary, medical
care"). The contention is not wholly polemic. The current state of American medi-
cine was explored in SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, 1973 REPORT. That report recommended:
Injury Prevention-The Commission recommends the development of in-
tensified medical injury prevention programs for every health-care institu-
tion in the nation, such programs to be predicated on the following:
1. investigation and analysis of the frequency and causes of the general
categories and specific types of adverse incidents causing injuries to
patients;
2. development of appropriate measures to minimize the risk of injuries
and adverse incidents to patients through the cooperative efforts of
all persons involved in the providing of patient care in such institu-
tions.
Id., quoted in W. CURRuAN & E. SHAPIRO, Law, Medicine and Forensic Science 519-
20 (3d ed. 1982).
17. See Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation, supra note 10, at 657.
18.
Forty years ago, a physician's only treatment of a patient's illness might be
to sit at the side of the bed and comfort his patient and the family while
the patient died. The same patient today may be treated by very complex
methods, such as open heart surgery, from which he is more likely than
not to recover, but in which the incidence of untoward result is high. The
patient forgets that 40 years ago he would have died without medical
intervention. Now he expects perfection from the surgeon and files suit for
the untoward result.
A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 401 (2d ed. 1978). See also Recent Medical
Malpractice Legislation, supra note 10, at 657 (patients have "unrealistic expecta-
tions" of a treatment's outcome, a frame of mind fostered by media attention on
modern medical care).
19. In a national survey, physicians were categorized according to medical spe-
cialty and geographical setting. Langwell & Werner, Regional Variations in the
Determinants of Professional Liability Claims, 5 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 498
(1980-81). The researchers attempted to calculate the statistical likelihood of a mal-
practice suit being brought against the average physician in each category. Id. at
504-07. The survey showed a markedly higher probability of a malpractice suit being
brought against a physician if he practiced in an urban area. Id. at 509, 510 (Table
5). The authors conclude: "[T]he analysis suggests that there are systematic differ-
ences in the likelihood of a claim for physicians located in different regions. These
differences may be associated with variations in demographic characteristics of the
population, availability of medical resources, or in legal environment." Id. at 512.
Specifically, the authors argue that the number of "malpractice incidents ...was
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against a physician the patient hardly knows. 20 As one commentator
has pointed out, "when this is coupled with the frustration of having
no effective channel for complaint, a patient may file a malpractice
claim because he has little reason for restraint." 2' Indeed, if he is
seriously injured and has lost the ability to earn a living, he may have
no choice but to do so.
The proliferation of malpractice litigation is exacerbated by the
phenomenon of modern science itself. Medicine, as it embraces tech-
nological advances, offers new hope through innovative yet risky
techniques to those previously considered untreatable.2 2 This results in
a situation where these patients sometimes emerge from hospitals with
legal claims against their physicians for less than perfect outcomes.2 3
Such claims may arise because a physician performed the procedure
significantly related to [such variables as] per capita income, availability of medical
facilities and legal services. . . . Educational levels may be associated with differ-
ences in the ability of patients to identify actual violations of medical standards,
while higher income levels may imply easier access to the legal system." Id. at 499.
20. One commentator has warned that urbanization and specialization have
depersonalized the doctor-patient relationship to the point that it has become easy for
a patient to blame the doctor when results are less than he had hoped for. See Recent
Medical Malpractice Legislation, supra note 10, at 657. The physician is likely today
to be a specialist to whom the patient has been referred on a one-time basis. This is
because medical advances have increased the number of recognized specialties and
subspecialties. W. CURRAN & E. SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 346-47.
21. Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation, supra note 10, at 657.
22. See A. HOLDER, supra note 18, at 401. See also Mechanic, supra note 12, at 3.
"Increasingly, physicians have available a more powerful technology for evaluating
and treating disease, but a technology that also can cause havoc when incorrectly
applied. The traditional practitioner, with his little black bag, was able to affect a
disease in only a modest way, but his possibilities of doing harm were also more
limited than at present." Id.
23. " 'Physicians who are innovative in their medical or surgical treatments and
who have an unavoidably poor result are often penalized in malpractice litigation
because their methods differ from the average care or norm in their areas.' " T.
LOMBARDI, supra note 5, at 23-24 (quoting George Himler, former President of New
York State Medical Society). The development of procedures and medications which
allow for the transplantation of human organs, especially the kidneys, heart, skin, or
cornea, have raised a plethora of legal questions, including the issues of what consti-
tutes acceptable transplant procedures. Annot., 76 A.L.R.3d 890, 893 (1977). For a
survey of how the courts have viewed the liability of those who perform such
procedures, see id. at 901-04. In a recent case, Colton v. New York Hosp., 918 Misc.
2d 957, 414 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), the supreme court consid-
ered the effect of a covenant not to sue signed by a kidney donor prior to the
operation. Noting the "experimental and inherently dangerous" nature of the proce-
dure, the court said that such a procedure "foreseeably" contains certain "untoward
consequences" which may be covered by the agreement. Id. at 969-70, 414 N.Y.S. 2d
at 876. But negligent acts and their causation to the injuries was outside the scope of
the agreement and the court remanded these issues for trial. Id.
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improperly. 24 However, adverse effects often result from an unavoid-
able and necessary risk of a new or difficult procedure.
2 5
The increasing number of lawsuits has intensified the need for
physicians to obtain insurance to protect themselves from losses. Medi-
cal malpractice insurance policies indemnify physicians 26 from "all
risks encountered." 27 Such insurance is generally perceived by the
medical profession as a shield that need only be raised against "dam-
ages suffered as the result of malpractice. ' 28 Some commentators,
however, suggest that the now ubiquitous insurance serves as a con-
venient monetary pool for juries to compensate those who suffer the
adverse results of a medical procedure when no malpractice in fact
occurred.2 9 In any event, the rising number of successful lawsuits and
the increasing monetary values of the awards has caused a parallel
increase in medical malpractice insurance premiums.30 The increased
premiums generally are passed on to patients in the form of higher
fees, 3' particularly to patients in urban areas.32
24. For a discussion of malpractice definitions and what constitutes a proper
standard of care, see D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 3.1 (1973).
25. See Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation, supra note 10, at 655-56.
Whether these adverse results are due to negligent or non-negligent causes is a
dividing line issue for those who have shaped the public debate over this matter.
Some writers argue that the patient often is injured as a result of a series of unavoid-
able medical events unrelated to negligence by medical personnel. See Mechanic,
supra note 12, at 16. Cf. Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 12, at 75. Others place
the blame for most injuries on physicians who delay treatment or are careless. See C.
KRAMER, supra note 8, at 249. The theory that the increased number of medical
injuries is due mainly to negligence was recently stated this way: "The enormous
quantity of research . . . generated by the debate over malpractice in 1975 did not
produce one shred of evidence suggesting. . . that the injuries of successful claimants
result from anything other than avoidable medical negligence." Law, supra note 14,
at 41.
The issue of what caused an injury is often made more difficult for a jury because
the plaintiff initially comes to the defendant suffering from some symptom or ail-
ment; the effects of this ailment must be distinguished from the result of the alleged
malpractice.
26. The scope of this Note will be limited to the impact of malpractice awards
and settlements upon physicians and their patients. Insurance plans which indemnify
hospitals are not discussed.
27. 11 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 44.372-.373 (rev. ed. 1982).
28. T. LOMBARDI, supra note 5, at xv.
29. Id. See generally Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation, supra note 10, at
655-60 (large monetary awards for malpractice claimants, whether in fact they were
injured through an act of negligence or not, invariably are paid by insurance).
30. See notes 2 & 5 supra.
31. Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence, 1978 NEW ENG. J.
OF MED. 1282, 1287 (patients bear most of the burden of higher malpractice insur-
ance premiums through higher health insurance premiums). See also Langwell &
Werner, supra note 19, at 498-99 (higher premiums and increased likelihood of
claims result in "increased costs of care as physicians pass premium increases on to
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B. The Unfulfilled Goals of Malpractice Litigation
Ideally, a negligently injured patient should receive adequate com-
pensation for his losses. This compensation award should deter any
potential tortfeasor from acting in a similarly negligent fashion. 33
Unfortunately, however, the current system of malpractice litigation
and insurance coverage obscures society's goals in affixing damages. 34
First, many injured patients have claims that are too modest or
difficult to prove, and thus not worth the time and expense of lengthy
litigation. 35 These patients, therefore, may receive no compensation at
all. 36 Second, the system of malpractice insurance insulates both ac-
tual and potential tortfeasors from the "deterrence signal ' 37 of dam-
age awards. 3 The potential tortfeasor is insulated because premium
consumers in the form of higher fees"). Because premiums are raised evenly within
each medical specialty and geographical subdivision, no physician need fear setting a
rate grossly inconsistent to those of his colleagues in a locality. See note 78 infra and
accompanying text.
32. In general, premium rates for all physicians practicing in urban areas are
higher and must be absorbed in the local fee structure. See notes 66-70 infra and
accompanying text.
33. Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 31, at 1284-85.
34. See note 31 supra and accompanying text and notes 38 & 42 infra and
accompanying text.
35. Mechanic, supra note 12, at 10.
36. See note 12 supra.
37. Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 31, at 1282.
38. Id. at 1287. Malpractice insurance premiums are set only by specialty and
geographical area. See notes 39-40 infra and accompanying text. As Prosser has
stated, deterrence is an important factor in awarding damages. W. PRossEa, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 5, at 23 (4th ed. 1971).
The "prophylactic" factor of preventing future harm has been quite im-
portant in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only with
compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer. When
the decisions of the courts become known, and defendants realize that they
may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to prevent the
occurrence of the harm. Not infrequently one reason for imposing liability
is the deliberate purpose of providing that incentive.
Id. However, physicians whose insurance is influenced only by specialty and local-
ity-but not history of wrongdoing-are "virtually insulate[d]" from being punished
through premium increases. Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 31, at 1287. This is
because surcharges reflecting such a history are often only set by peer review boards.
Havighurst, Medical Adversity Insurance-Has Its Time Come?, in MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE 57 n.7 (1977). The peer review system of premium surcharges has been
developed because of the medical profession's perception that (1) malpractice claims
are often randomly incurred, (2) they are not equitably related to acts of negligence
and (3) these physicians should not be shielded. Id. Thus, verdicts of liability often do
not have the desired effect upon past or potential tortfeasors. Id. at 72 n.52. For a
discussion of peer review systems in New York State see note 42 infra. "Virtually the
only penalty currently paid by the negligent physician is the value of his time spent in
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increases, uniformly rated by geographical location 3 and specialty
"group," 40 may be hidden in fees. 41 Moreover, the vast majority of
actual tortfeasors insured in New York State pay little if any surcharge
on their insurance premiums. 42 Thus, the prudent physician often
pays the same premium as the reckless one.
defending a suit and the costs of his embarrassment." Schwartz & Komesar, supra
note 31, at 1287.
39. Premium rates for New York physicians are grouped according to five geo-
graphical territories. The first four territories include New York City and the subur-
ban counties of Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Rockland, Orange, Sullivan and Ul-
ster. The fifth category is composed of the remainder of the state. Premium rates in
the latter, depending upon medical specialty, are approximately one-half or one-
third of those for the physicians serving the more populated area. RATE MANUAL,
supra note 5.
40. Premium rates in New York also are determined accor 'ng to membership in
certain specialty groupings. It has been suggested that this system leads to insulation
of the tortfeasor:
Malpractice insurance, as it is currently administered, virtually insulates
the negligent physician from the damages award and, thus, from the
malpractice [deterrence] signal. The reason is simple: the malpractice
premiums of individual physicians are rarely influenced by their record of
claims, settlements and verdicts. Rather, premiums are usually set for an
entire specialty group in a given region. Thus, the physician with a record
of frequent negligence bears no larger share of the burden than his col-
leagues with excellent records. No individual physician has more than a
slight pecuniary incentive to reduce the expected losses resulting from his
own behavior.
Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 31, at 1287.
41. However, this system may not totally insulate physicians. Some commenta-
tors have suggested, for example, that fear of malpractice suits exists and is socially
beneficial in that it encourages the practice of defensive medicine, particularly the
use of all available diagnostic tests. See Havighurst, supra note 38, at 57 n.8; Law,
supra note 14, at 41.
42. Physician/tortfeasors in New York may have their individual premiums ad-
justed according to one of two systems. Physicians covered under the Medical Liabil-
ity Mutual Insurance Company who experience claims or awards against them may
appear before the Medical Liability Defense Board to protest a surcharge or cancel-
lation of their policies. The review is subjective and designed to allow the physician
to explain his use of proper procedures in the matter. Exact statistics on the numbers
surcharged are not kept, but are believed to be minimal. Presser, supra note 2.
Physicians covered under the Medical Malpractice Insurance Association, including
those who have had policies cancelled elsewhere, are subject to a system of automatic
surcharges. Policies may not be cancelled. The surcharge system provides for a 25 to
200% surcharge on the individual's premium rates depending upon the number of
points accumulated. The first surcharge, 25%, is levied when three points have
accumulated. Payment of any claim against a policy accumulates two points. Filing
of any claim for which a cash reserve of more than $250,000 must be kept, based
upon the nature and likely success of the claim, results in the accumulation of one
point. Presser, supra note 2.
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C. Previous Legislative "Reforms"
Legislative concern with the system of malpractice litigation and its
insurance nexus has rarely focused on solving the broad policy prob-
lems underlying malpractice suits. Rather, the emphasis has been
placed on making malpractice insurance available to physicians at an
affordable price.
The New York Legislature's first major attempt at adjusting medi-
cal malpractice premiums came during the 1975 legislative session 43
after two large medical malpractice carriers refused to cover members
of the New York State Medical Society. 44 The carriers claimed that it
was unprofitable to insure New York State physicians due to escalat-
ing awards to malpractice victims. 45 Their refusal to insure the state's
physicians left no major malpractice carrier. As the legislature met to
solve the problem, physicians threatened that increased premiums
would force them to give up their practices en masse. 46
After a five-month debate, 47 the legislature passed a seven-point
package 41 specifically designed to lower malpractice insurance premi-
43. [1975] NEW YORK LEcis. ANN. 419. In 1974, the legislature responded to
rising premiums by establishing mandatory screening panels for malpractice cases. T.
LOMBARDI, supra note 5, at 85. Procedures for the panels are codified in N.Y. JUD.
LAW § 148-a.1 (McKinney 1983). The panels are designed to relieve the congestion
on civil court calendars by requiring each plaintiff to first present his case before a
volunteer panel composed of a supreme court justice, an attorney and a physician for
a determination of liability. The plaintiff may accept the finding or go to trial, but
the panel's finding will be presented to the court. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PANELS IN FOUR STATES 3-5 (1977).
44. For a discussion of the loss of the Employers Insurance of Wausau and
Argonaut Insurance companies, see T. LOMBARDI, supra note 5, at 85-87. See also Rx
for New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 467, 468
(1975).
45. T. LOMBARDI, supra note 5, at 85-86. From 1958 to 1975, malpractice awards
for medical society members rose from $1.3 million to $28 million. Id. at 87-88
(citing Medical Society statistics). By 1981, this figure had reached $90 million. See
note 2 supra. Critics of the companies charged that the unprofitability in malpractice
insurance lines in the 1970's was also due to bad financial investments pursued by the
carriers. See Law, supra note 14, at 42; Sansweet, Teledyne Takes Drastic Steps in an
Effort to Salvage Its Argonaut Insurance Unit, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1975, at 26, col.
6; Herman, Damage Insurers Hit by Losses on Stocks, Rise in Claim Amounts, Wall
St. J., Jan. 20, 1975, at 1, col. 6. Today, several companies continue to write a small
number of policies, largely as a courtesy to some physicians or as a part of a package
of larger policies for the insured. Presser, supra note 2.
46. See T. LOMBARDI, supra note 5, at 91.
47. For a detailed account of the various lobbying efforts, hearings and studies
which preceded passage of the legislative package, see generally T. LOMBARDI, supra
note 5, at 83-107.
48. This seven-point package was embodied in the following eight statutory
changes. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1983) (limited medical mal-
19831 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ums by decreasing claim loss. 49 The package shortened the statute of
limitations in malpractice suits to two and one-half years or ten years
for minors or others acting under disability; permitted consideration
of payments from collateral sources; limited the cause of action based
on a lack of informed consent to non-emergency situations; and made
the findings of pre-trial screening panels admissible at trial. 50 Avail-
ability of coverage was guaranteed by requiring all remaining carriers
to provide an insurance pool through ,a Joint Underwriting Associa-
tion.51 Despite the substantive nature of the new statutes, many physi-
cians felt these measures would be insufficient in lowering premiums
and a scattered work stoppage occurred.52 Persons who observed the
so-called "crisis" later said that the legislative package would not solve
the problem.5 3 Additionally, it was predicted that physicians would
be forced to leave the state if the premium spiral continued. 54
practice actions based on a lack of informed consent); N.Y. INs. LAW § 335 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1982-1983) (mandated reporting of medical malpractice claims); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (limited commencement of
medical malpractice actions to two and a half years after termination of treatment);
id. § 208 (limited commencement of medical malpractice actions for persons under a
disability of infancy to a period of ten years after accrual of the action); id. § 4010
(McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (extended admissibility of collateral source payments to
medical malpractice trials; was amended in 1981 to mandate the reduction of such
payments from awards); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5501-5515 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983)
(established a joint underwriting association to provide medical malpractice insur-
ance); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a.8 (McKinney 1983) (allowed the finding of malpractice
screening panels to be admissible at trial); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230 (McKinney
Supp. 1982-1983) (established an Office of Professional Medical Conduct).
49.
The Primary purpose of the new malpractice bill is to minimize claim loss
experience so that medical malpractice insurance premiums will be kept
within acceptable reach. To accomplish this objective many rational con-
siderations fell by the wayside as a politically expedient solution accept-
able to everyone caught up in the malpractice maelstrom evolved. CPLR
214-a represents that compromise, and virtually every sentence contained
therein is troublesome.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 214-a Practice Commentary (McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
50. See note 48 supra.
51. N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 5501-5515 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983), discussed in note
48 supra. This entity is now known as the Medical Malpractice Insurance Association
(MMIA). In 1978, the New York State Medical Society formed a separate nonprofit
carrier, the Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company (MLMIC). N.Y. Times,
Nov. 24, 1978, at A2, col. 3. Today, the MMIA insures approximately 3,000 New
York State physicians and MLMIC approximately 22,000. Presser, supra note 2.
52. T. LOMBARDI, supra note 5, at 98-99.
53. See id. at 95. See also Special Advisory Panel on Medical Malpractice, New
York State Legislature, Recommendation No. 1 [hereinafter cited as Special Advisory
Panel], (cited in T. LOMBARDI, supra note 5, at 177 ("the overriding concern should
be to create a system of compensation for adverse medical outcomes resulting from
medical treatment, whether or not caused by negligence.")). Id.
54. T. LOMBARDI, supra note 5, at 95.
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The statistics gathered since enactment of the legislation by the
New York State Insurance Department show that the legislative pack-
age has had "no significant effect" in reversing the upward spiral in
damage awards. 55 Thus, despite the legislature's express goal of stabi-
lizing insurance premiums, 56 premiums have increased. Rather than
relocate or refuse to work, physicians have passed the continued in-
creases to patients in higher medical fees. 57 Moreover, the broader
issues of deterrence and proper compensation remain unaddressed.
III. New Attempts at Controlling Costs
A. The 1981-1982 Premium Increases
During the past two years, the continued growth in malpractice
awards has forced the State Insurance Department to allow substan-
tive premium increases for physicians. In 1981, the Medical Malprac-
tice Insurance Association (MMIA), the joint underwriting associa-
tion, and the Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company
(MLMIC), the private carrier set up by the state medical society to
serve its members, requested premiums of 367.8 and 71 %, respec-
tively. 58 Because of the disparity in the rate requests, a private actuar-
ial service was retained by the department to make an independent
determination of a justified rate increase. 5 This report was ultimately
rejected by the insurance superintendent for a variety of reasons.60
55. Presser, supra note 2.
56. [1975] NEw YORK LEcis. ANN. 419; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 214-a Practice
Commentary (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
57. See note 8 infra and accompanying text.
58. The MLMIC request was reduced to 52% after the legislature amended the
Civil Practice Law and Rules to provide for mandatory abrogation of the collateral
source rule in medical malpractice cases. See note 48 supra. The MMIA request was
reduced to 210% after further adjustments. New York State Insurance Dep't News
Release, Oct. 31, 1981.
59. The decision by then Insurance Superintendent Albert Lewis to retain the
private service, Presley and Associates, Inc., was unprecedented within the depart-
ment. The firm recommended an across the board increase for both companies of
107%. New York State Insurance Dep't*News Release, Oct. 31, 1981.
60. In re Medical Malpractice Insurance Association and Medical Liability Mu-
tual Insurance Company, New York State Insurance Dep't, Opinion and Decision
(Oct. 30, 1981). In his opinion, Superintendent Lewis cited several reasons for
rejecting the Presley recommendations. These included judgmental differences in
actuarial methods, id. at 7-8; inadequate consideration given to investment income,
id. at 10; reduction in the statute of limitations, id.; and the continuously declining
birthrate in New York State, id. at 6.
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Rate increases of 26.6% for MLMIC61 and 27.8% for MMIA for 1981
were approved.62
In 1982, the two insurers filed for rate increases of 243% (MMIA)
and 73% (MLMIC).6 3 MLMIC received an increase of 15% ;64 MMIA
has challenged this rate and is seeking a higher increase in proceedings
before a departmental law judge.6 5
For physicians with maximum coverage of $1 million per person/
$3 million per occurrence, these rate increases raise annual premiums
to rates ranging from $1,494 for psychiatrists and pathologists in the
upstate counties to $46,044 for neurosurgeons in Nassau, Suffolk and
Sullivan Counties. Illustrative of rate differentials by specialty are the
premiums paid by an internist ($5,776) and a general surgeon
($20,794) in the same area for the same coverage.66
In addition to classification by specialty, the rates reflect a strict
geographical breakdown.67 The highest premiums are paid by physi-
cians in the five boroughs of New York City, Nassau, Suffolk, Rock-
land, and Sullivan Counties. 8 The same neurosurgeon, internist and
general surgeon practicing in an upstate county would pay annual
premiums of $20,830, $3,350 and $12,060 respectively.69 On average,
rates for urban physicians are roughly twice those paid by physicians
in more rural areas.70
B. The Proposed Patient Compensation Fund
The 1981-1982 rate increases were accompanied by debate among
legal, medical and insurance interests over how high an increase, if
any, was justified.7 1 In addition, substantive legislative reform was
61. This included a 5.3 % one-time surcharge as an addition to MLMIC's surplus
account. Id. at 11.
62. Id. at 11-12.
63. Presser, supra note 2.
64. RATE MANUAL, supra note 5.
65. This matter is still pending before a departmental law judge.
66. These rates are for the Borough of Manhattan. RATE MANUAL, supra note 5.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. This calculation is based on a comparison between rates charged in New
York City, Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Rockland, Sullivan, Ulster, and Orange
Counties and the remaining counties in New York State.
71. During the 1981 departmental hearings, actuaries using identical data pro-
duced widely varying projections for the amount of required premium increase. By
contrast, the New York State Trial Lawyers Association advocated a reduction in
premiums. See Trial Bar Hits Bid to Raise Medical Malpractice Costs, N.Y.L.J., June
12, 1981, at 1, col. 2; 107% Malpractice Insurance Rate Rise Urged, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 13, 1981, at 61, col. 1.
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proposed by Governor Hugh Carey.72 The proposed bill called for a
patient compensation fund for payment of certain large medical mal-
practice awards.73 The fund, created through a surcharge on health
insurance premiums, 74 was offered as a way of lessening the financial
burden on health care consumers 75 and responsible physicians. 76 As a
practical matter, the bill would lower the pressure on malpractice
carriers by having the fund reimburse them for ninety percent of
awards between $250,000 and $1 million. 77
It was hoped the bill would ameliorate two perceived problems.
First, that sufficient monies to pay increasing malpractice awards
could no longer be raised through the traditional method of increasing
premiums. Second, that increased premiums (as well as existing pre-
miums) would be routinely passed into medical fees.78 The problem of
72. Program Bill. No. 387/82, proposed April 6, 1982 [hereinafter cited as Pro-
gram Bill]. A program bill is prepared by the governor's staff to reflect the governor's
suggested reform and is circulated in hopes of attracting a legislative sponsor. See also
Carey is Seeking Major Changes on Malpractice, N.Y. Times, April 7, 1982, at B1,
col. 6.
73. Section 710 of the proposed bill provided for reimbursement to medical
malpractice insurance carriers of 90 % of awards between $250,000 and $1 million
from a health insurance supported fund.
74. The fund would have provided for direct payment into the fund by most
health insurers on a percentage basis. This funding method is unique to patient
compensation funds established in other states, which require payments by health
care providers. See Schrero, Patient Compensation Funds: Legislative Responses to
the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 5 Am. J. OF L. & MED. 175, 178-79 (1979).
75. See N.Y. Times, April 7, 1982, at BI, col. 6. Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, health advisor
to Gov. Carey, was quoted as saying: "[T]he consumer pays no matter what." Id.
76. Memorandum accompanying Program Bill No. 387/82, at 5.
77. Program Bill, supra note 72, § 710.
78. The governor's staff confirmed the practice of passing on the cost of medical
malpractice insurance premiums to patients in the form of increased medical fees.
Data gathered in preparation of the bill showed that increases in premium rates
directly resulted in medical fee increases. In some cases, the percentage of the
premium increase was reported to patients as the reason for identical percentage fee
increases. But the actual dollar increase paid by the physician was actually a smaller
component of his total costs. The existence of the "pass-along" was the major impetus
for the drafting of the bill. Telephone interview with Kevin McAnaney, Ass't Counsel
to Gov. Carey (Oct. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as McAnaney interview]. These
findings were embodied in the bill:
1. The escalation of medical malpractice premium rates constitutes a
critical threat to the health care delivery system in this state.
2. The availability of medical malpractice insurance coverage at afforda-
ble rates is essential to assure that patients are properly compensated
for injuries caused by medical malpractice.
3. In order to assure that injured patients are properly compensated and
to maintain the integrity of the state's health care delivery system,
which is affected with the public purpose of providing quality treat-
ment to the citizens of this state, it is necessary that health care insurers
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the "pass-along" was addressed by establishing a standard rate of
payment into the fund by health insurance carriers79 and then requir-
ing these carriers to monitor the medical fees they reimburse for any
unjustified increase.80 Thus, a major portion of the state's malpractice
payment, evidenced by uneven rates and borne by health-care con-
sumers and their insurance carriers, would be paid more "precisely" 8'
and evenly by those who pay medical fees. Opponents of the bill 2
argued that the pass-along of premiums might not be routine.8 3 The
bill's ultimate demise resulted from opposition to patients being forced
to pay for the negligence of physicians. 84
If the public policy adopted sub rosa by the failure of the Carey
administration bill is that the tortfeasor should continue to pay for his
negligent acts, then it is useful to ask: Is the tortfeasor paying for his
negligence under the present system? If a patient compensation fund
should not be used to pay for negligently caused injuries, might it then
and self-insurers assume a portion of the costs of medical malpractice
insurance directly rather than indirectly.
4. The risk of medical liability and the costs of medical malpractice are, in
significant part, a component of the aggregate cost of our health care
delivery system. Such costs are currently borne by the public in the
form of higher hospital and medical fees and increases in health insur-
ance premiums which do not precisely reflect increases in medical
malpractice insurance rates.
Program Bill, supra note 72, § 702, Statement of Legislative Findings and Declara-
tion. The bill never attracted a sponsor and thus never generated a formal legislative
bill number. McAnaney interview, supra.
79. Program Bill, supra note 72, § 706.
80. Id. §§ 702.5, 711.1.
81. Id. § 702.4.
82. Lobbyists for unions and businesses which pay for the bulk of health insur-
ance premiums in the state applied pressure in the legislature which defeated the bill.
Major health carriers also told legislative leaders they did not believe that malprac-
tice insurance premiums were being routinely passed on to patients as a hidden cost
of medical care. Telephone interview with legislative aide, July 10, 1982 (anonymous
by request). Several commentators also attacked the bill and its theoretical basis. See
Multi-fault Plan for Malpractice, Rochester Times-Union, May 6, 1982, at 12A, col.
1; Law, supra note 14.
83. Law, supra note 14. But the practice has been documented in other studies.
See Roddis & Stewart, The Insurance of Medical Losses, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,
supra note 12, at 109-10; Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 31.
84. One legislative aide stated the argument this way: "Many people objected to
the idea of the victim paying for the tort." Telephone interview with legislative aide,
July 10, 1982 (anonymous by request). See also Law, supra note 14, at 42 ("It makes
no sense to devote substantial resources to the determination of fault, and then to
allow the financial consequences of these proven wrongs to be shifted directly to the
patients and the public."). Id.
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be used to solve the nagging issue of paying for those who cannot
prove negligence? 5
C. The 1983 Proposal
During the 1983 legislative session, a new reform proposal was
introduced 86 which adds several procedural steps for malpractice liti-
gants87 and limits awards for non-economic losses to $100,000. s In
addition, it calls for an amendment to the New York State Constitu-
tion which would enable the legislature to provide for an alternative
forum for adjudication of malpractice claims.89 The proposal, which
is now being studied by the Committees on Health and Insurance, has
been attacked as "immuniz[ing] the medical profession from responsi-
bility for tortious acts" and "a thinly veiled attempt to wipe out
malpractice actions." '90 The proposal, however, does recognize the
continued upward spiral of malpractice awards and their adverse
impact on health care costs."' But because it continues to provide for a
85. See Special Advisory Panel, supra note 53, at 177. This panel report, never
adopted by the legislature, briefly discussed the idea of devising some system of
compensating victims of "adverse outcomes," but did not suggest specifically how the
system should work or how it should be funded. Id.
86. S.2122, A.2497 (1983), was introduced on Feb. 1 by State Sen. Tarky Lom-
bardi, Jr. and several co-sponsors.
87. The principal features of the proposal are: a requirement that the plaintiff
post a bond to cover defendant's costs at trial if the plaintiff decides to proceed after a
finding of no liability by the medical malpractice screening panel. S.2122, A.2497 § 5
(1983) (although a waiver is allowed for certain indigents), id.; reduction of attor-
neys contingent fees, id. § 6; requirement that qualified experts certify the meritori-
ousness of claims when they are filed, id. § 8; and sets additional requirements for the
pedigree of expert witnesses, id. In addition, the proposal sets up a system of regional
offices of professional conduct. Id. § 1.
88. Damages for compensation of pain and suffering are limited to $100,000. Id.
§ 9.
89. S.Res. 2121 (1983) proposes a constitutional amendment which would autho-
rize the legislature to establish alternative methods of adjudication of medical mal-
practice claims, "with or without trial by jury."
90. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
91. Introductory Memorandum accompanying S.2122-83 (Statement in Sup-
port):
The size of medical malpractice insurance premiums has risen dramati-
cally since the medical liability crisis of 1975 when the commercial insur-
ance industry ceased writing this type of coverage. Malpractice premiums
have more than doubled in the intervening seven years as a result of
dramatic increases in the frequency of medical liability suits and the
severity of the awards granted by jurys [sic] in such suits . . . .The bill's
provisions will assure the continued availability of high quality medical
care to all New Yorkers and will positively impact our overall effort to
control rapidly escalating health care costs.
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uniformity in treatment of all physicians -and all patients, it fails to
bring an adequate "deterrence signal"9 2 into the system. It also fails to
address the problems of those who are adversely injured but are
unable to prove negligence. 3 Moreover, the bill places severe proce-
dural and remedial burdens on all injured parties, even those who
may be the victims of the worst kinds of malpractice.
IV. Compensation for Medical Victims: A Proposed Modification
A. Malpractice Reformers
Since the difficulties in the current system of compensating mal-
practice victims became apparent more than a decade ago,94 several
commentators have forwarded detailed proposals for reform. In gen-
eral, most of these proposals seek to change the orientation of the
adjudicatory process. Instead of asking if negligence occurred and
who was at fault, the proposals focus on whether the injury occurred
and how much compensation should be offered. The proposals em-
phasize the goal of providing a quick, but moderate, measure of
compensation instead of forcing victims to engage in the difficult
procedure of litigating the fault of the physician. In this respect, such
schemes closely resemble the rationale for establishment of the work-
er's compensation system. 5
92. See notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text.
93. See note 12 supra and accompanying text & notes 94-104 infra and accompa-
nying text.
94. Best known in this area are the works of Professors Havighurst, Keeton,
O'Connell and Tancredi. See generally Havighurst, supra note 38; Havighurst and
Tancredi, supra note 12; Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA.
L. REv. 590 (1972-73); O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance:
Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REv. 749 (1973).
95. In examining the needs for a non-judicial system of compensating workplace
injuries, the Supreme Court noted:
[I]n the highly organized and hazardous industries of the present day the
causes of accident are often so obscure and complex that in a material
proportion of cases it is impossible by any method correctly to ascertain
the facts necessary to form an accurate judgment, and in a still larger
proportion the expense and delay required for such ascertainment amount
in effect to a defeat of justice; that, under the present system, the injured
workman is left to bear the greater part of industrial accident loss, which
because of his limited income, he is unable to sustain, so that he and those
dependent upon him are overcome by poverty and frequently become a
burden upon public or private charity; and that litigation is unduly costly
and tedious, encouraging corrupt practices and arousing antagonisms be-
tween employers and employees.
N.Y. Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197 (1917).
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As an example, the proposal for "Medical Adversity Insurance"
(MAI) 96 suggests an extra-judicial (but legislatively mandatory) sys-
tem of insurance compensation of any medical "result" which appears
on a pre-selected list.97 These results, or adverse outcomes, would
include the products of ordinary negligence as well as non-negligent
but iatrogenic98 injuries. Q° Left to judicial consideration are only cases
of "failure to obtain informed consent, abandonment of the patient,
gross negligence, intentional misconduct, and illegal behavior." 100 As
a practical matter, the system sought to emulate the "no-fault" insur-
ance concept by "dispensing with the expensive process of assigning
blame in each case."°10 But it parts company with the traditional no-
fault scheme by "retain[ing] an element of [health care] provider
responsibility for adverse outcomes as a means of maintaining desir-
able incentives" 0 2 through the use of an "experience rating" 103 on the
provider's adversity insurance premiums. Thus, the scheme sought to
compensate all injuries on a pre-selected list-without any direct
assignment of blame. Those within the plan include the patients who
were unavoidably injured, as well as those who could prove malprac-
tice.
Perhaps the most significant element of the MAI proposal lies in its
recognition that many patients injured as they pass through the health
care system are not compensated for their losses. Among the uncom-
pensated are those patients whose injuries were not caused by negli-
gence or who could not prove negligence. 0 4 It is clear that any system
96. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 12.
97. "Compensable events" included such injuries as foreign bodies or burns
acquired during surgery, perforation of the uterus during dilation and curettage, or
bacterial sepsis following a blood transfusion. Havighurst, supra note 38, at 79-81.
98. Iatrogenic injuries are those "[d]enoting an unfavorable response to therapy,
induced by the therapeutic effort itself." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 688 (illus.
24th ed. 1982).
99. Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 12, at 75-77.
100. Id. at 76.
101. Id. at 70.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 72.
104. For examples of New York cases in which patients sustained severe injuries
but were unable to prove negligence and thus received no compensation, see De
Falco v. Long Island College Hosp., 90 Misc. 2d 164, 393 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1977). In De Falco, a patient underwent cataract surgery and devel-
oped a drop of blood and an infection in his eye, which necessitated its removal. The
patient was unable to prove negligence by either surgeon or hospital despite testi-
mony that a nurse had retrieved an eye patch from the floor and placed it over the
patient's eye. The court said this act "bespeaks improper treatment and malpractice"
but declined to find liability against defendants in the absence of expert testimony
proving that germs from the floor had caused the infection. Id. at 167, 393 N.Y.S.2d
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which broadens its definitions to include such persons would allow a
greater number of injured persons to gain compensation. 05 An expan-
sive definition of patients who suffer "adverse injury" might encom-
pass patients who would otherwise have obtained large awards-
whether due to jury confusion or sympathy for the plaintiff if the
matter had gone to trial.'0
at 862; see also Henry v. Bronx Lebanon Medical Center, 53 A.D.2d 476, 385
N.Y.S.2d 772 (1st Dep't 1976). In Henry, a child was delivered with fractures of the
skull and collarbone, and injuries to the upper and lower arm despite a lack of
physical abnormalities in the mother which might have precluded a normal birth.
The delivery was complicated by the unusual position of the child prior to delivery
which required the use of forceps to complete the delivery. The court found that the
use of forceps, the method of application and the failure to choose an additional x-ray
test or perform a surgical delivery did not constitute malpractice. Id. at 480-81, 385
N.Y.S.2d at 775. "Presence of an injury does not mean that there is negligence," the
court said. Id. at 480, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 775. See also Charlton v. Montefiore Hosp.,
45 Misc. 2d 153, 256 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965). In Charlton, a
patient who underwent surgery for removal of a growth on her left eye emerged from
surgery with a drooping eyelid, possibly the result of an injection of anesthesia there.
"Before there can be a recovery here," the court said, "it is necessary for plaintiff to
establish that there has been a deviation from the proper surgical and operative
methods. In a case like this, the mere fact of an unexpected result does not give rise to
the presumption of negligence, and to permit a trier of fact to indulge in such an
inference would in reality permit speculation as to the basic cause of the injury." Id.
at 156-57, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
105. Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 12, at 89.
106. The difficulty some courts have in separating underlying physical condition
from malpractice or in placing the blame for an injury on a physician in a close case
is as often resolved in favor of the patient as it is against him. See note 104 supra. The
problem was stated succinctly in Monahan v. Weichert, 82 A.D.2d 102, 442
N.Y.S.2d 295 (4th Dep't 1981), in which a patient suffering from severe rheumatoid
arthritis of the knee joints underwent surgery for knee joint replacement which
resulted in the loss of mobility of the joints. The court noted: "In this medical
malpractice case we consider primarily the problem of distinguishing the effect of
[defendant's] alleged negligence from the natural results of [plaintiff's] disease. .. "
Id. at 103, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 296. "Here we are concerned with the operation of two
independent forces, one being the course of plaintiff's illness. To establish a prima
facie case plaintiff need not eliminate entirely all possibility that defendant's conduct
was not a cause, but only offer sufficient evidence from which reasonable men may
conclude that it is more probable that the injury was caused by the defendant than
that it was not." Id. at 108, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 299. See also Spadaccini v. Dolan, 63
A.D.2d 110, 407 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1st Dep't 1978). In Spadaccini, the plaintiff, who
underwent surgery to relieve a severe infection in his chin and mouth, suddenly
turned blue and began choking in the post-operative period. Id. at 113-15, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 842-43. This choking caused a lack of oxygen which in turn resulted in
brain damage and eventual death. Id. at 115, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 843. The plaintiff
alleged negligence in an alleged 15-minute delay in providing ameliorative treatment
to him. Id. The defendants contended that the brain damage was irreversible after
one minute and failure to perform a tracheotomy as a preventative measure immedi-
ately after surgery was a mere error in judgment. Id. The court dismissed this
contention. Id.
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The MAI concept suffers from an unduly narrow list of compensa-
ble injuries; resolution of the question of whether a given injury falls
within a category of "adverse injury" as set forth by MAI would be by
a bureaucratic determination. Moreover, MAI swallows up the con-
cept of ordinary negligence and its usefulness as a deterrent. Tort
litigation and injury compensation need not be warring concepts.
Elements of both could, and should, be retained in a dual system of
compensation.
B. The Proposal
An alternative approach would allow the jury to reach one of three
possible verdicts: no injury, adverse injury or medical malpractice.
The middle-level adverse injury verdict would be available to those
unable to show negligence. The size of the award would be restricted
by limiting damages awarded for such non-economic losses as "pain
and suffering." 10 7
As the adverse injury plaintiff might be said to have suffered only
the inherent risk of the treatment he had undergone, a logical source
for the funds to satisfy such restricted awards would be a surcharge on
health insurance premiums, as was contemplated in the Carey pro-
posal.108 Use of the fund would be restricted to non-negligently in-
jured patients. By contrast, a fund drawn from the contributions of
patients to satisfy awards arising from medical malpractice is less
desirable. 109
A finding of medical malpractice with a full range of damages
would still be available to the jury in a proper case. Such damages
would be assessed against the physician/tortfeasor and ultimately his
medical malpractice insurance carrier. The inherent deterrence value
in a verdict of negligence would have greater impact as such verdicts
would become less frequent. The malpractice award would then be
closely tied to the negligent physician and his colleagues through a
The difficulty juries often have with reaching a fair verdict in a malpractice case is
illustrated by those cases in which courts have been forced to reduce awards as
"excessive" or "grossly excessive." See, e.g., Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 88
A.D.2d 217, 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1st Dep't 1982); Ramsey v. Jewish Hosp., 67 A.D.2d
680, 412 N.Y.S.2d 173 (2d Dep't 1979); Roman v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp., 51 A.D.2d
529, 379 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1st Dep't 1976).
107. Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 12, at 101; Special Advisory Panel, supra
note 53, at 180.
108. See notes 72-85 supra and accompanying text.
109. Legislative opponents of the fund successfully used this point to defeat the
concept. See notes 72-85 supra and accompanying text.
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system of mandatory premium adjustments based on the risk he actu-
ally presents to his insurance carrier." 0 This risk would be predicated
on previous malpractice awards against the physician. This type of
system has been suggested as the most appropriate method of passing a
deterrence signal"' back to actual and potential tortfeasors. 2 More-
over, individualized premiums would be more difficult to pass back to
patients in the form of increased fees." 3
V. Constitutional Issues
Attempts to limit monetary recovery generate strong constitutional
challenges. Challenges to such reforms would most probably involve
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Supreme Court, however, has noted that "statutes limiting
liability are relatively commonplace and have consistently been en-
forced by the courts." " 4 Indeed, statutes which limit recovery by
injured parties have created a system of worker's compensation,1 5
limited the liability of operators of nuclear power plants," 6 upheld
international agreements which limit recovery for injuries suffered
during international air travel,"17 provided special benefits for victims
110. Under an experience rating, the insured party would have his future premi-
ums mandatorily assessed based upon the individual risk he now presents to the
insurer. Under a retroactive premium adjustment, he would be contractually bound
to pay an adjustment on his previous premium rate for the year of the occurrence.
For a brief description of how this would be adapted to medical liability insurance,
see Roddis & Stewart, supra note 83, at 128-29. One study of 8000 physicians in Los
Angeles over a four-year period showed that .6 % (46 physicians) accounted for 10 %
of all claims and 30% of all awards paid under an insurance plan. Schwartz &
Komesar, supra note 31, at 1289 n.32 (citing Phelps, Experience Rating in Medical
Malpractice Insurance (Rand Corp. 1977)).
111. Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 31, at 1284-85.
112. See id.at 1287, Phelps, supra note 110.
113. A physician who alone in his area received a sharp premium increase and
passed this increase in fees would then be charging rates disproportionate to his
colleagues and not within the health insurance reimbursement rates.
114. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32
(1978).
115. N.Y. Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (upheld compensation
payment to widow of railroad night watchman killed while on duty); Mountain
Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (logging company required to
contribute to workman's compensation fund).
116. Duke, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (limited liability from accidents at private nuclear
power plants to $560 million in an indemnification fund).
117. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Pan Am. Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1944) (limited liability of international airplane travelers to limits estab-
lished under the Warsaw Convention). Cf. Franklin Mint v. TWA, 690 F.2d 303 (2d
Cir. 1982) (held unenforceable cargo liability limitation in the United States).
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of "black lung disease," 8 and limited the recovery of certain auto
accident victims under no-fault insurance."'
A. Equal Protection Challenges
Legislative efforts in the 1970's to insure the availability of malprac-
tice insurance by altering the litigation and compensation of malprac-
tice claims invariably met with constitutional challenges. Such mea-
sures were viewed as interfering with patients' equal protection
rights. 120 State courts construing these statutes failed to agree on their
constitutionality.' 2 ' Much of this disagreement, it has been suggested,
evolved from judicial uncertainy over which equal protection stan-
dard should be applied. 122
Under the minimal "rational basis" test, medical malpractice legis-
lation gained easy judicial approval. 123 Equal protection challenges to
new malpractice legislation, at least in New York, would likely follow
the "rational basis" 124 analysis used by the New York Appellate Divi-
118. 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1976).
119. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1975) (upheld application of state no-fault insurance law in case involving automo-
bile accident).
120. Victims of medical malpractice have argued that the creation of such devices
as pre-trial screening panels, stringent statutes of limitation, or absolute limits on
awards amounted to impermissible discrimination based solely on their status as
patients. See generally M. REDISH, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE CRISIS: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS (Am. Hosp. Ass'n 1977); Harper, Which
Equal Protection Standard for Medical Malpractice Legislation?, 8 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 125; White & McKenna, Constitutionality of Recent Malpractice Legislation,
13 FORUM 312 (1977-78). For a recent example see also Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 121 Cal. App. 3d 135, 148, 175 Cal. Rptr. 177, 183-84 (Ct. App. 1981).
121. Harper, supra note 120, at 126.
122. M. REDISH, supra note 120, at 20-21. Under the traditional two-tiered ap-
proach, the right of a potential plaintiff to sue was not deemed fundamental, thus
allowing a state to impinge on this right on a showing of a rational relationship of the
measure to a valid state goal. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2
(1973). However, the two-tiered approach was thought to have been supplemented
by a "means scrutiny" test which required examination of the methods asserted by
the state in attaining its goals. "[U]nder the means scrutiny test the courts would
probably ask: 1) Is there in fact such a crisis? 2) If there is, will the legislation in
question substantially tend to alleviate the problem?" M. REDISH, supra note 120, at
21 n.78. For an example of one state court's use of this test, see Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
123. M. REDISH, supra note 120, at 18. The strict scrutiny test is historically
reserved for statutes which limit either a fundamental right or a right enjoyed by a
"suspect class," L. TRIBE, supra note 120, at § 16-6. But the Supreme Court ap-
peared, for a brief time, to be evolving a middle level "means scrutiny" test. The
court has since abandoned this test. M. REDISH, supra note 120, at 23-25.
124. "In the area of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classification made by its laws are
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sion in Comiskey v. Arlen.125 In Comiskey, the court upheld the
admissibility at trial of the findings of the state's medical malpractice
screening panels. 2 The panels had been established by statute. 12
7
The effect of the court's ruling, which rested on the reasoning of the
New York Court of Appeals in upholding the New York "no-fault"
automobile insurance statute, 12 was to give the legislature broad
powers to legislate in the event of increasing medical malpractice
insurance rates. 29 The court stated that the pre-trial screening panels
did not deny fundamental access to the courts.13 0 Rather, the panels
bore a rational relationship to the "urgent necessity to find a reason-
able procedure for dealing with the crisis situation of increasing medi-
cal malpractice insurance rates." 131
Attempts to limit recovery by malpractice plaintiffs also have had a
checkered history. The malpractice insurance statutes which included
this feature in the 1970's at first fared poorly in the era of the state
courts' equal protection uncertainty. 132
imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis' it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety
or because in practice it results in some inequity."' Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d
304, 314, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (2d Dep't 1976) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 371, 485 (1970)).
125. 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1976).
126. Id. at 306, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
127. The screening panels were established under N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a.1
(McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). See note 43 supra.
128. "More importantly, a finding of unconstitutionality herein is precluded by
the decision of our Court of Appeals in Montgomery v. Daniels .... " Comiskey v.
Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 307, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 125 (2d Dep't 1976) (citing Montgom-
ery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444 (1975)).
129. Id. at 304, 314, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129-30 (2d Dep't 1976).
130. Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d at 315, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 130 (2d Dep't
1976).
131. Id. at 129-30, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
132. In Pendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977), the Nebraska
Supreme Court applied a "rational basis" test and cited Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 485 (1970) for the proposition that legislatures should be given broad
discretion in matters of economics and social welfare. 199 Neb. at 113, 256 N.W.2d
at 668. In Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 329-30, 347 N.E.2d
736, 743 (1976), the Illinois Supreme Court did not deal with federal constitutional
principles and instead overturned a $500,000 recovery limitation statute, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 70, § 101 (1975), based upon the Illinois Constitution. In Jones v. State Bd.
of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), the Idaho Supreme Court refused to
decide the merits of a similar statute, IDAHO CODE § 39-4201 (1975), chose the "means
scrutiny test" as the appropriate test, and remanded the matter for further findings.
97 Idaho 859, 871, 555 P.2d 399, 411 (1976).
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In a more recent case, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,133 the
California Court of Appeals held that only the two-tier approach is
now available and that the limited recovery statute at issue, involving
neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental interest, should be
analyzed by the rational basis test.13 4 The Fein court did not use any
specific Supreme Court decision to support its use of the "rational
basis" test as the correct analytical tool and relied solely on California
case law.135 Another appellate court decision, however, 136 relied upon
the Supreme Court's holding in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group, Inc. 137 in determining that standards of ration-
ality l3  are to be used in analyzing constitutional challenges to state
medical malpractice legislation. 3 1
Duke concerned a challenge to the Price-Anderson Act,'140 which
limited the liability of power companies from a nuclear accident to an
aggregate of $560 million.' 4 1 Congress enacted the limitation on the
theory that the "potentially vast liability in the event of a nuclear
accident" 142 could not be absorbed by the nuclear energy industry and
private insurance carriers; thus it was an obstacle to the development
of this new source of energy.143
133. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 121 Cal. App. 3d 135, 175 Cal. Rptr.
177 (Ct. App. 1981). In Fein, the plaintiff had challenged the California Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act, CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1982-1983)
Supp.), which provided, in part, that recovery for non-economic losses be limited to
$250,000. Plaintiff, an attorney employed by the California legislature, had won
$500,000 at trial for losses resulting from the failure of defendants to test for and
prevent a debilitating heart attack he suffered after complaining of symptoms during
three emergency room visits for a week prior to the attack. 121 Cal. App. 3d at 143-
46, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82. The court in Fein found that the "significantly increas-
ing numbers of suits . . . increasing settlements and awards . . . projected losses
related to malpractice insurances . . . decreased number of companies. willing to
provide malpractice insurance and skyrocketing costs of such insurance" provided a
sufficient basis for the legislature's choice and thus was not arbitrary. 121 Cal. App.
3d at 151, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
134. 121 Cal. App. 3d at 149, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
135. 121 Cal. App. 3d at 149-50, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 184-85.
136. Barme v. Wood, 122 Cal. App.3d 395, 176 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1981). In Barme,
the plaintiff in intervention challenged a companion section of the Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act, CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.1, (West Supp. 1982-1983),
which barred recovery of funds by collateral sources from the tortfeasor.
137. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
138. Id. at 93-94.
139. Barme v. Wood, 122 Cal. App. 3d 395, at 399, 176 Cal. Rptr. 42, at 47-48.
140. 71 Stat. 576, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
141. Id.
142. Duke, 438 U.S. at 64.
143. Id. "As we read the Act and its Legislative history, it is clear that Congress'
purpose was to remove the economic impediments in order to stimulate the private
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The Duke court dismissed the appellees' claim that an equal protec-
tion violation ensued from setting up different legal treatment for
victims of nuclear accidents, as compared to those injured by other
causes.144 The Court applied a standard of "rationality" and found
that "the important congressional purpose of encouraging private
participation in the exploitation of nuclear energy. . . is ample justifi-
cation" 145 for setting up the special treatment. The Duke decision is
indicative of the judicial support for statutes which "rationally" im-
pose on jury awards in malpractice cases.
B. Due Process Challenges
The due process right to sue under a particular legal theory and win
damages is generally held to be subject to legislative change. 14 But the
standard for substituting a common law remedy was not discussed
until the 1917 decision in N.Y. Central R.R. Co. v. White 147 uphold-
ing the New York workmen's compensation statute. The language in
White suggests, but does not require, the standard of a "reasonable
substitute" 14 for replacement by a legislatively enacted compensation
scheme. Sixty-two years later, the Supreme Court, in Duke, declined
to resolve the issue of what force should be given this language.149
The Duke decision provides new strong support for legislative en-
actments which limit the liability of injured persons in deference to a
development of electric energy by nuclear power while simultaneously providing the
public compensation in the event of a catastrophic nuclear incident." Id. at 83.
144. Id. at 93-94.
145. Id. at 93.
146. This derives from the rule stated in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876):
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common
law .... Rights of property which have been created by the common law
cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of
conduct, may be changed at the will, or even the whim, of the legislature,
unless prevented by constitutional limitations.
147. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
148. Id.
Nor is it necessary, for the purposes of the present case, to say that a state
might, without violence to the constitutional guaranty of "due process of
law," suddenly set aside all common-law rules respecting liability as be-
tween employer and employee, without providing a reasonably just substi-
tute .... No such question is here presented, and we intimate no opinion
upon it.
Id. at 201.
149. Duke, 438 U.S. at 88.
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broader societal goal 150-only if the substitution is "reasonably
just."'' In setting this standard of review, the court said that the
liability-limitation provision thus emerges as "a classic example of an
economic regulation"'' 5 2 which " 'come[s] to the Court with a pre-
sumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complain-
ing of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted
in an arbitrary and irrational way.' " 153
Appellees in Duke rested their due process claims on three argu-
ments: first, " '[t]he amount of recovery is not rationally related to the
potential losses'; second, because '[t]he Act tends to encourage irre-
sponsibility in matters of safety and environmental protection . . .'
and finally because '[t]here is no quid pro quo' for the liability limita-
tions.' ' 154 The Court found the monetary figure within permissible
limits 155 and noted that safety requirements were covered adequately
in the federal licensing procedures."
In deciding the quid pro quo issue, the Court cast its answer in the
context of the White decision upholding worker's compensation stat-
utes: 157 that a "panoply of remedies and guarantees is at the least a
reasonably just substitute for the common-law rights replaced by the
150.
The record before us fully supports the need for the imposition of a
statutory limit on liability to encourage private industry participation and
hence bears a rational relationship to Congress' concern for stimulating the
involvement of private enterprise in the production of electric energy
through the use of atomic power ...
Id. at 84.
151. Id. at 88. For a discussion of the view that medical malpractice compensation
schemes fail the "reasonably just substitute" test where applied to victims of negli-
gence, see Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Con-
stitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARv. J.
ON LEcIS. 143 (1981). Learner considers the reasoning in Duke inapplicable to
uphold limited liability of medical tortfeasors on the assumption that medical negli-
gence might be preventable and that a private tort action forms the only method of
deterring irresponsible conduct, id. at 179-80, whereas other factors are available
which deter nuclear accidents, automobile accidents and workplace accidents. Id. at
181. However, this Note proceeds from the premise that many medical accidents are
unavoidable, see notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text, and that private tort
actions are, in the present system, an inadequate method of deterring tortfeasors. See
notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text.
152. Duke, 438 U.S. at 83.
153. Id. (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976)).
154. Duke, 438 U.S. at 82 (citing Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. U.S. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.C. 1977)).
155. Duke, 438 U.S. at 87.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 92-93.
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.. . [a]ct. Nothing more is required by the Due Process Clause."'158
The Court noted that under the worker's compensation program an
injured worker is "entitled to moderate compensation in all cases of
injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy without the difficulty
and expense of establishing negligence or proving the amount of the
damages."'' 5 9 These factors were analagous to the compensation
scheme under the Price-Anderson Act.' 0 Again, Duke evidences judi-
cial support for the statutes restricting malpractice awards.
VI. Conclusion
The litigation process involving those injured during medical treat-
ment presents inequities for injured patients, physicians and health
care consumers. Many patients recover disproportionately large
awards. Others, unable to prove negligence, receive no compensation
or are unable to enter the system at all. In addition, physicians have
become insulated from the deterrence value of tort awards, as all
share equally for the negligence of a few. Consumers pay high fees
reflecting increasing insurance premiums. New York's first attempts at
reforming this system amounted to ineffectual tinkering. The cost
spiral and inherent inequities appear to be endemic. Further attempts
to eliminate these inequities must address the problems of all groups if
any measure of success is to be made.
Reforms in the present tort/litigation/insurance system are neces-
sary. Any changes must contain these components: A mechanism for
compensating all injured victims; a new source of funding such com-
pensation; an effective means of deterring actual and potential tort-
feasors; and a flexible method of separating negligent injuries from
adverse medical results.
A patient compensation fund, evenly funded through all health
insurance premiums, is the logical mechanism for compensating ad-
verse results. It would provide a moderate level of compensation
without requiring proof of negligence. However, the right to prove
malpractice and win regular damages would still be made available in
a proper case. As society still has a vital interest in deterring tort-
158. Id. at 93. For a discussion of the ensuing confusion over whether the court in
White had required a quid pro quo, see M. REDISH, supra note 120, at 39.
159. Duke, 438 U.S. at 93, (citing N.Y. Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,
201).
160. Id.
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feasors, these damage awards should result in mandatory insurance
surcharges.
Society needs to compensate injured persons and to deter tort-
feasors. Under this system, the burden of all injuries would fall pre-
cisely on those who could, and should, pay for them.
Janice Kabel
